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et al.: Search and Seizure

SEARCH & SEIZURE
N.Y. CONST. art. L § 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

COURT OF APPEALS
2 198
People v. Bialostok
(decided February 25, 1993)

Criminal defendants, Milton Bialostok and Lawrence Scocco,
appealed their convictions for conspiracy and promoting
gambling which were partially based on evidence secured through
a warrantless pen register search. 2 199 Defendants claimed that
their state constitutional rights were violated 2200 and such
2198. 80 N.Y.2d 738, 610 N.E.2d 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1993).

2199. Id. at 742, 610 N.E.2d at 375-76, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03. A pen
register is used to "identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the
telephone line to which such device is attached." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 705.00(1) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994).
2200. Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d at 743, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at
703. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("The right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications
shall not be violated .... ").
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evidence should have been suppressed because the pen register's
audio capacity required a warrant which was neither sought nor
issued. 220 1 The New York Court of Appeals held that pen

registers enhanced with audio capacity do require a warrant

2202
regardless of whether such audio capacity is, in fact, utilized.
In light of other incriminating evidence, however, the Bialostok
2203
court held that failure to obtain a warrant was harmless.
In the course of investigating the defendants and others,
authorities placed pen registers on two telephone lines which
were suspected of being used by the defendants to take illegal
bets.2204 No warrant was needed to use a pen register and,

therefore, none was obtained. 2205 Because of the telephone
numbers dialed, a warrant was eventually obtained to allow an
eavesdropping device to be installed on the two lines. 220 6 The

pen register which had already been installed had the dual
capacity of both identifying telephone numbers dialed as well as

2201. See Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d at 743, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at
703. As the court explained, New York law required a warrant for the use of
electronic eavesdropping devices however, a standard pen register was not
considered an eavesdropping device and thus required no warrant. Id.
Defendant Scocco further claimed that the electronic eavesdropping evidence
against him should have been suppressed because authorities did not notify him
of the wiretap within ninety days of its termination as required by New York
law. Id. at 742, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 703; see also N.Y.
CGRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.50(3) (McKinney 1984). The statute states in
pertinent part:
Within a reasonable time, but in no case later than ninety days after
termination of an eavesdropping warrant ....

written notice of the fact

and date of the issuance of the eavesdropping warrant, and of the period
of authorized eavesdropping, and of the fact that during such period
communications were or were not intercepted, must be personally
served upon the person named in the warrant ....
Id. The Bialostok court held that the defendant did have "adequate informal
notice" and therefore the evidence did not have to be suppressed. Bialostok, 80
N.Y.2d at 742, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
2202. Id. at 745, 610 N.E.2d at 378, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
2203. Id. at 745-46, 610 N.E.2d at 378, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
2204. Id. at 742, 610 N.E.2d at 375, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
2205. Id. at 743, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
2206. Id.
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2207
monitoring the audio content of the telephone transmissions.
Therefore, all that needed to be done was to attach an audio cable

to the installed pen register. 220 8 This allowed the content of the

2209
phone conversations to be heard.
Defendants claimed the eavesdropping evidence should have

been suppressed at trial because the pen register was actually an
"eavesdropping device."2210 Defendants contended that because
of its ability to switch to being an eavesdropping device, it should
have required a warrant before installation, even for use as a pen
register. 2211 No evidence was introduced that the pen register

was improperly used as an eavesdropping device before the

22 12
warrant was obtained.
The court of appeals decided that the dual purpose pen register
required a warrant. 22 13 The court emphasized that the purpose of
requiring a warrant for audio listening devices "is to interpose a
neutral and-detached Magistrate between citizens and the police
to protect individuals from having to rely on the good conduct of
the officer in the field for the protection of their right to be free
of unreasonable searches." 22 14 The court explained:

2207. Id. As revealed at trial, however, the audio capacity of the pen register
was at first disabled. Id. The installer testified that the audio portion of the
device was connected once an eavesdropping warrant was obtained. Id. The
warrant was issued, and the telephone conversations were monitored for ten
days ending on December 22, 1986. Id. However, the warrant itself contained
a December 26th expiration date. Id. at 746, 610 N.E.2d at 378, 594
N.Y.S.2d at 705. The ninety day post termination notice was served ninety
days after the original expiration date but ninety-four days after the
eavesdropping actually terminated. Id.
2208. Id. at 743, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
2209. Id.
2210. Id. See also N.Y. CPmi. PROC. LAW § 700.05(1) (McKinney 1984).
The statute states in pertinent part: "'Eavesdropping' means 'wiretapping' or
'mechanical overhearing of conversation,' as those terms are defined in section
250.00 of the penal law." Id.
2211. Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d at 743, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at
703.
2212. Id.
2213. Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d at 742, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at
703.
2214. Id. at 745, 610 N.E.2d at 377, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
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This is a technology that has the capacity, through willful use or
otherwise, to intrude on legitimately held privacy, and it is the
warrant requirement, interposing the Magistrate's oversight, that
provides to citizens appropriate protection against unlawful
intrusion. Thus, we hold the devices employed here were subject
to the warrant requirement and installation of them without one
22 15
was unlawful.
In People v. Guerra,22 16 the court of appeals ruled that there is
no constitutional violation by the use of traditional pen registers
which are able to "provide a list of all numbers dialed, both local
and long distance or toll calls .
"2217 The court reasoned that
a warrant is not necessary because defendants have "no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the records maintained by the telephone

company. "2218
However, in People v. Gallina22 19 the court of appeals refused
to allow authorities to merely deactivate an eavesdropping device
which was still present where it was installed, during a time
when the warrant was ineffective regardless of whether such
authorities were engaged in unauthorized eavesdropping "because
it is the potential for abuse that is the focus of analysis." 2220 The
court stated that "[tihe danger of inadequate inactivation is, of
' 222 1
course, that an unauthorized eavesdropping will result.
Therefore, in New York, a device with the capacity to intrude
upon the "legitimately held privacy" involved in telephone
conversations requires a warrant. 2222

2215.
2216.
2217.
2218.
N.E.2d
2219.
2220.
2221.
2222.
705.

Id. at 745, 610 N.E.2d at 378, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
65 N.Y.2d 60, 478 N.E.2d 1319, 489 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1985).
Id. at 64, 478 N.E.2d at 1321, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
Id. (quoting People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 241-42, 433
513, 516, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (1982)).
66 N.Y.2d 52, 485 N.E.2d 216, 495 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1985).
Id. at 58, 485 N.E.2d at 219, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 12 (citations omitted).
Id. at 57 485 N.E.2d at 219, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d at 745, 610 N.E.2d at 378, 594 N.Y.S.2d at
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On the federal level, the Supreme Court recognized, in Katz v.
United States, 2223 that citizens can reasonably expect the contents
of their telephone conversations to remain private. 2224 However,
in Smith v. Maryland,2 2 2 5 the Court distinguished the use of pen
registers and stated that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy for telephone numbers dialed. 2226 The Court reasoned
that because the telephone company has access to all phone
numbers dialed, it is unreasonable to expect that the numbers
dialed are private. 2227 The Court's rationale was that "[t]hese
devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone
numbers that have been dialed .... Neither the purport of any

communication... nor whether the call was even completed is

disclosed by pen registers." 2 228
To date there has been no distinction drawn between traditional
and dual purpose pen registers by the United States Supreme
Court. 2 229 Following Smith, there is no constitutional violation to
using a pen register without a warrant. Since the court in
Bialostok made the distinction between traditional pen registers
and advanced dual purpose pen registers, New York affords
defendants greater constitutional protection in this area.

2223. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The United States Supreme Court stated
that "a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment." Id.
2224. Id. at 352.
2225. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
2226. Id. at 741-42.
2227. Id. at 742-43.
2228. Id. at 741.(quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159, 167 (1977)).
2229. Several state courts have declined to follow Smith v. Maryland and
Katz v. United States. See, e.g., State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990)
(rejecting the 2-pronged test for searches and seizures and adopting a Ipronged test of whether society is prepared to recognize and expectation as
'reasonable'); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988) (rejecting the Katz
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test and adopting the test of whether one
has a right to privacy); Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1989)
(holding that for use of a pen register probable cause is required, contrary to
Smith); Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers she dials
even though the telephone company may have access to those numbers).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

5

